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Based on the theoretical foundations as described in Bhagwati (1974), illegal trade can be 
defined to consist of faked invoicing on the one hand and smuggling on the other hand. 
While in the first case at least one of the trading partner countries has recorded a trade 
flow either as an export or as an i mport, in the latter case no official customs data is 
available. Smuggling is bypassing legal trade channels altogether. Therefore it is difficult to 
estimate the full magnitude of illegal trade with the help of one single method. In this paper 
we rather t ried to detect faked invoicing and smuggling in the Balkans separately. 
Therefore we first tried to measure illegal cross-border trade in South East Europe (SEE) in 
order to have at least some impressions about the magnitude of this phenomenon and 
second w e analysed illegal trade from a more theoretical perspective and provided an 
overview of possible policy relevant aspects. The paper ends with some discussion on the 
impact of illegal trade on security and of some soft security instruments that could be used 
to address it.  
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Based on the theoretical foundations as described in Bhagwati (1974)
1, illegal trade can be 
defined to consist of faked invoicing on the one hand and smuggling on the other hand. 
While in the first case at least one of the trading partner countries has recorded a trade 
flow either as an export or as an import, in the latter case no official customs data is 
available. Smuggling is bypassing legal trade channels altogether. Therefore it is difficult to 
estimate the full magnitude of illegal trade with the help of one single method. Rather we 
shall try to detect faked invoicing and smuggling in the Balkans separately. Therefore we 
shall first try to measure illegal cross-border trade in South East Europe (SEE) in order to 
have at least some impressions about the magnitude of this phenomenon and second we 
shall analyse illegal trade from a more theoretical perspective and give an overview of 
possible policy relevant aspects. The paper ends with some discussion on the impact of 




2. Measuring Illegal Trade in South East Europe 
 
In this section of the paper we will try to provide a crude estimate of the magnitude of the 
illegal cross-border trade in the Balkans in recent years. In this respect we shall divide our 
analysis in two parts according to the definition of illegal trade by Bhagwati (1974). First we 
will analyse faked invoicing in South East Europe with the help of partner-country-data 
comparisons. This will be followed by an analysis of SEE smuggling in a case study on 
tobacco smuggling. The aim of this analysis is to go beyond the usual anecdotal evidence 
as described e.g. in Hajdinjak (2002) or local press articles as e.g. in Kavain (2003) and to 
present some quantitative estimates. 
 
 
2.1. Measuring Faked Invoicing in South East Europe 
 
The principal technique of detecting illegal trade – the partner-country-data comparison 
technique – has its roots in the work of Morgenstern (1950) on the accuracy of foreign 
trade statistics. The technique was further developed by Naya and Morgan (1969) and 
Bhagwati (1964), who linked the discrepancies of partner-country foreign trade data to the 
economic rationale of the underinvoicing of imports carrying high duties. 
                                                                 
1   This book is a compilation of pioneering articles in the theory and measurement of illegal trade.   5
However, discrepancies of partner-country foreign trade data can occur for many reasons. 
According to ITC (2003) these reasons can be grouped as follows. One reason for the 
differences in the export data of one country as compared to the import data of the other 
country is due to differences in the coverage and the time of recording. This includes 
differences in the practices of: including specific goods or not (e.g. returned goods, 
emergency aid, military goods); the classification of goods or services (e.g. software); 
statistical threshold values; confidentiality; simplification; time lag in compilation (e.g. due to 
the time lag between shipment and arrival); reference period; and finally illegal and 
unrecorded trade. The other reasons are differences in the application of: the trade system 
(general or special trade system); commodity classification; valuation (cif or fob, currency 
conversions); quantity measurement (gross or net, units); partner country (transit trade or 
re-export); and errors and estimations. 
 
In general it can be assumed that import figures should be somewhat higher than export 
figures. Usually exports are valued fob (free on board) and imports cif (cost insurance and 
freight). On average it is observed that the difference of freight and insurance costs make 
about 10%. Under the (probably strong) assumption that all the other reasons for 
discrepancies between partner-country trade data do not follow a certain pattern but occur 
randomly and therefore should balance over the period of observation, and under the 
assumption that the difference of fob and cif values are on average 10%, the remaining 
discrepancies can be attributed to faked invoicing and thus illegal trade. 
 
There can be different incentives for faking invoices. In countries with foreign exchange 
controls and a substantial black market for foreign currencies it can be profitable to 
underinvoice exports and overinvoice imports. There might be an incentive for capital flight. 
However, in the case of the SEE countries (and its main trade partner – the EU) major 
foreign exchange controls are not any more in practice and the black market  for foreign 
currencies almost vanished. Here it could be assumed that the incentive works in the other 
way. Due to tariff and value added tax (VAT) collection as well as non tariff barrier (NTB) 
regulations at the borders there is an economic rationale for the underinvoicing of imports. 
There could also be an incentive for the overinvoicing of exports due to VAT refund and 
exports subsidies for certain products. Overinvoicing of exports might also be a way of 
money laundering. In this respect we shall analyse the trade data of the Balkan countries in 
comparison to the mirror trade data as provided by the trade partner countries. 
 
For this task we shall use the trade data compiled by the International Trade Centre (ITC) 
which is the technical cooperation agency of the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). We will also apply the 
ITC methodology for the calculation of discrepancy measures as described in ITC (2003). 
Discrepancy measures are being calculated at the four-digit level of the Harmonised 
System (HS) for the 98 countries reporting their trade data to the United Nations Statistics   6
Division (UNSD) Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE) in 2001. This 
includes data on imports and exports  by partner country and by major product. 
Unfortunately Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria and Serbia and Montenegro are not 
included in this database. Thus the analysis has to restrict at this stage to Albania, Croatia, 
Macedonia and Romania. This is a relatively strong restriction to the analysis as especially 
Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as Serbia and Montenegro are important trading partners 
for Croatia and Macedonia respectively. For this reason we shall investigate in addition 
bilateral trade flows as provided directly by the customs offices of Croatia and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina subsequently. 
 
In the following tables we will generally provide the data on exports fob (or imports cif) of 
the analysed country, the mirror estimate cif (or the corresponding fob estimate) of the 
partner countries as well as a discrepancy indicator for the respective trade flows by 
countries or products and the analogous discrepancy indicator for the respective partner 
country versus the world or the respective product in world trade. This can help to get a 
feeling whether the discrepancy is in line with the other data or specific for the analysed 
country. In accordance with ITC (2003) we calculate the discrepancy (total) measure 
relative to the total recorded trade flows. Thus, for exports the discrepancy indicator D x is 
defined as: 
 
Dx=100*(M-T)/(T+M),  (1) 
 
where M is the mirror estimate and T is the reported trade flow of the home country. 
Consequently we have to change the sign for the import discrepancy indicator Dm, which is 
defined as: 
 
Dm=100*(T-M)/(M+T).  (2) 
 
The discrepancy measures for the world trade is calculated in the same way but on the 
world trade value for the respective country or product group under review. 
 
In addition to this we calculated in each table an adjusted mirror estimate and an adjusted 
discrepancy indicator assuming the difference between fob and cif values to be 10% on 
average. This leads us to a new cif adjusted discrepancy indicator (calculated as defined in 
equation 1 and 2) and a lower bound estimate of illegal exports or imports due to the 
underinvoicing of imports (and/or overinvoicing of exports) when the sign is positive and 
overinvoicing of imports (and/or underinvoicing of exports) when the sign is negative. The 
(strong) assumption is that all the other possible causes of discrepancies occur randomly 
and balance over the period of observation.   7
Table 1 
Albania: Faked Invoicing in 2001 Exports, by main countries of destination 
                 
  Export
1)  Mirror
1)  Discrepancy  Partner country    Mirror  Discrepancy  Illegal  Product groups with 
  fob  estimate, cif  (total)
2)  vs world    estimate, fob
3)  (cif adj.)  Exports  highest discrepancies 
  USD mn  USD mn  %  %    USD mn  %  USD mn  HS 4-digit code 
                 
TOTAL  294.4  355.5 9.4  .    323.2  4.7  -28.8  . 
                 
ITALY  216.4  228.5 2.7  5.6    207.7  -2.0  8.7  6205 ,6403 ,7202 ,1604 
MACEDONIA  6.3  1.2 -67.3  -18.6    1.1  -70.5  5.2  2716 ,3801 ,7311 ,8414 
SWITZERLAND  4.5  0.3 -88.8  1.0    0.3  -88.6  4.2  4907 ,7113 ,1211 
CROATIA  0.0  0.9 94.3  8.1    0.8  100.0  -0.8  1211 ,2610 ,2621 ,3921 
SPAIN  0.3  1.4 66.8  3.2    1.3  61.8  -1.0  0910 ,3907 ,6204 ,6205 
AUSTRIA  0.7  1.9 45.7  3.4    1.7  42.3  -1.0  3815 ,4907 ,6204 ,6205 
NETHERLANDS  0.4  1.8 65.9  -12.1    1.6  60.7  -1.2  2401 ,3002 ,3901 ,8431 
USA  2.0  7.6 58.0  5.5    6.9  55.1  -4.9  0712 ,2401 ,6403 ,8542 
GREECE  38.6  57.4 19.6  -1.0    52.2  15.0  -13.6  6305 ,6104 ,6201 ,6111 
FRANCE  2.0  17.5 79.5  0.0    15.9  77.7  -13.9  2530 ,8414 ,1211 
                  Source: Own calculations, ITC, based on COMTRADE data of the UNSD.           
Notes: 1) Only include trade with reporting countries; 2) Defined as 100*(M-T)/(T+M), T: reported trade, M: Mirror estimate; 3) Assumed freight and insurance difference of 10%. 
Table 2 
Albania: Faked Invoicing in 2001 Exports, by main product groups 
                 
    Export
1)  Mirror
1)  Discrepancy  Discrepancy    Mirror  Discrepancy  Illegal 
    fob  estimate, cif  (total)
2)  (total), World    estimate, fob
3)  (cif adj.)  Exports 
    USD mn  USD mn  %  %    USD mn  %  USD mn 
                 
HS  Total  294.4 355.5  9.4  4.6    323.2  4.7  -28.8 
                 
6205 Men's shirts  17.4 7.8  -37.8  4.2    7.1  -42.1  10.3 
6406 Part of footwear; removable in-soles, etc  78.2 76.9  -0.8  2.0    69.9  -5.6  8.3 
6111 Babies' garments, knitted or crocheted  7.2 0.3  -91.1  11.6    0.3  -92.7  6.9 
6112 Track suits, ski suits and swimwear  6.5 2.7  -41.8  9.8    2.5  -45.2  4.0 
7113 Articles of jewellery & parts thereof   4.2 0.2  -91.4  -5.7    0.2  -91.7  4.0 
6206 Women's blouses & shirts  10.4 7.4  -17.2  10.9    6.7  -21.4  3.7 
1211 Medicinal plants  9.5 7.5  -11.8  10.1    6.8  -16.4  2.7 
6109 T-shirts, singlets and other vests  5.2 9.7  30.0  1.4    8.8  25.8  -3.6 
6403 Footwear, upper of leather  6.5 12.1  29.9  11.0    11.0  25.7  -4.5 
6204 Women's suits, jackets,dresses skirts etc  4.1 10.7  45.1  6.3    9.7  40.7  -5.6 
                 
Source: Own calculations, ITC, based on COMTRADE data of the UNSD.             
Notes: 1) Only include trade with reporting countries; 2) Defined as 100*(M-T)/(T+M), T: reported trade, M: Mirror estimate; 3) Assumed freight and insurance difference of 10%. 
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Table 3 
Albania: Faked Invoicing in 2001 Imports, by main countries of origin 
               
  Import
1)  Mirror
1)  Discrepancy  Partner country    Mirror  Discrepancy  Illegal  Product groups with 
  Cif  estimate, fob  (total)
2)  vs world    estimate, cif
3)  (cif adj.)  Imports  highest discrepancies 
  USD mn  USD mn  %  %    USD mn  %  USD mn  HS 4-digit code 
               
TOTAL  1,269.6 1,160.0  4.5  .  1276.0  -0.3  6.4  . 
                GREECE  343.0 346.3  -0.5  -0.7  380.9  -5.2  37.9  2523 ,2402 ,2710 ,2711 
ITALY  424.2 417.6  0.8  -4.3  459.4  -4.0  35.2  6203 ,2523 ,6406 ,4104 
SWEDEN  12.4 18.5  -19.8  8.6  20.4  -24.3  8.0  8529 ,4407 ,8525 ,8504 
NETHERLANDS  10.0 15.0  -20.2  2.2  16.5  -24.5  6.5  8529 ,8701 ,2402 ,8703 
CZECH REP  6.2 10.8  -27.6  -1.8  11.9  -31.4  5.7  2402 ,8607 ,3402 ,4011 
RUSSIAN FED.  17.2 8.9  32.0  9.7  9.8  27.5  -7.4  3901 ,4801 ,7207 ,2710 
CHINA  26.4 15.9  24.8  22.7  17.5  20.3  -8.9  0203 ,5513 ,6911 ,6404 
BELARUS  9.5 0.0  99.4  -60.3  0.0  100.0  -9.5  1107 ,1701 ,2402 ,3004 
GERMANY  77.7 58.1  14.4  0.3  63.9  9.7  -13.8  1701 ,8703 ,8517 ,8704 
UNTD.KINGDOM  47.2 21.9  36.6  -1.2  24.1  32.4  -23.1  2716 ,8506 ,2710 ,8212 
                Source: Own calculations, ITC, based on COMTRADE data of the UNSD.         
Notes: 1) Only include trade with reporting countries; 2) Defined as 100*(T-M)/(M+T), T: reported trade, M: Mirror estimate; 3) Assumed freight and insurance difference of 10%. 
Table 4 
Albania: Faked Invoicing in 2001 Imports, by main product groups 
                 
    Import
1)  Mirror
1)  Discrepancy  Discrepancy    Mirror  Discrepancy  Illegal 
    cif  estimate, fob  (total)
2)  (total), World    estimate, cif
3)  (cif adj.)  Imports 
    USD mn  USD mn  %  %    USD mn  %  USD mn 
                 
HS  Total  1,269.6 1,160.0  4.5  4.6    1276.0  -0.3  6.4 
                 
8525 Television camera, transmissn app for radiotel.  17.8 32.8  -29.6  -1.1    36.1  -33.9  18.3 
2710 Petroleum oils, not crude  60.0 60.5  -0.4  3.2    66.6  -5.2  6.6 
1701 Cane or beet sugar and chemically pure sucrose  13.1 16.8  -12.1  8.1    18.5  -17.0  5.4 
3004 Medicament mixtures (not 3002, 3005, 3006)  15.3 18.1  -8.4  1.0    19.9  -13.1  4.6 
8504 Electric transformer,static converter  10.4 13.3  -12.6  10.7    14.6  -16.9  4.2 
8517 Electric app f. line telephony,incl curr line system  57.9 49.3  8.0  6.9    54.2  3.3  -3.7 
2523 Cement, portland, aluminous, slag, supersulfate  45.3 37.4  9.5  14.5    41.1  4.8  -4.2 
8704 Trucks, motor vehicles for transport of goods  15.5 7.0  38.0  3.0    7.7  33.6  -7.8 
8703 Cars (incl. station wagon)  35.0 11.6  50.3  1.4    12.8  46.6  -22.2 
2716 Electrical energy   50.5 0.0  100.0  2.4    0.0  100.0  -50.5 
                 
Source: Own calculations, ITC, based on COMTRADE data of the UNSD.             
Notes: 1) Only include trade with reporting countries; 2) Defined as 100*(T-M)/(M+T), T: reported trade, M: Mirror estimate; 3) Assumed freight and insurance difference of 10%. 
   9
Table 5 
Croatia: Faked Invoicing in 2001 Exports, by main countries of destination 
                 
  Export
1)  Mirror
1)  Discrepancy  Partner country    Mirror  Discrepancy  Illegal  Product groups with 
  Fob  estimate, cif  (total)
2)  vs world    estimate, fob
3)  (cif adj.)  Exports  highest discrepancies 
  USD mn  USD mn  %  %    USD mn  %  USD mn  HS 4-digit code 
                 
TOTAL  3556.9  3127.1 -6.4  .    2842.8  -11.2  714.1  . 
                 
ITALY  1105.2  783.2 -17.1  5.6    712.0  -21.6  393.2  8901 ,2711 ,2710 ,4403 
GERMANY  688.6  597.8 -7.1  -1.1    543.5  -11.8  145.1  8901 ,9032 ,6406 ,6403 
AUSTRIA  267.4  168.0 -22.8  3.4    152.7  -27.3  114.7  8532 ,8529 ,8541 ,6403 
SLOVENIA  425.8  403.3 -2.7  2.0    366.6  -7.5  59.2  2710 ,3102 ,8708 ,4407 
MALTA  55.6  0.3 -98.9  -21.3    0.3  -99.0  55.3  8901 
GREECE  46.9  21.4 -37.3  0.0    19.5  -41.4  27.4  8901 ,2401 ,6806 ,4805 
SWITZERLAND  42.7  25.1 -26.0  1.0    22.8  -30.3  19.9  1001 ,2401 ,2716 ,7318 
RUSSIAN FED.  83.3  77.1 -3.9  -19.7    70.1  -8.6  13.2  8480 ,2103 ,8502 ,3004 
USA  119.6  145.2 9.7  5.5    132.0  4.9  -12.4  7308 ,2523 ,2710 ,9403 
EGYPT  12.7  35.5 47.3  -17.7    32.3  43.5  -19.6  7204 ,7207 ,2401 ,4407 
                  Source: Own calculations, ITC, based on COMTRADE data of the UNSD.           
Notes: 1) Only include trade with reporting countries; 2) Defined as 100*(M-T)/(T+M), T: reported trade, M: Mirror estimate; 3) Assumed freight and insurance difference of 10%. 
Table 6 
Croatia: Faked Invoicing in 2001 Exports, by main product groups 
                 
    Export
1)  Mirror
1)  Discrepancy  Discrepancy    Mirror  Discrepancy  Illegal 
    fob  estimate, cif  (total)
2)  (total), World    estimate, fob
3)  (cif adj.)  Exports 
    USD mn  USD mn  %  %    USD mn  %  USD mn 
                 
HS  Total  3,556.9 3,127.1  -6.4  4.6    2842.8  -11.2  714.1 
                 
8901  Cruise ship, cargo ship, barges  456.1 35.8  -85.5  -53.5    32.5  -86.7  423.6 
2711  Petroleum gases  117.8 68.6  -26.4  -0.5    62.4  -30.8  55.4 
0302  Fish, fresh, whole  37.3 9.0  -61.0  5.5    8.2  -64.0  29.1 
8532  Electrical capacitors, fixed, variable or adj.  26.7 1.1  -91.9  11.5    1.0  -92.8  25.7 
8541  Diodes/transistors&sim semiconductor dev.  27.3 2.9  -80.8  8.5    2.6  -82.4  24.7 
9032  Automatic regulating or controlling instruments  35.4 19.7  -28.5  4.8    17.9  -32.8  17.5 
6403  Footwear, upper of leather  101.5 94.3  -3.7  11.0    85.7  -8.4  15.8 
8708  Parts & access of motor vehicles  37.8 27.2  -16.2  2.4    24.7  -20.9  13.1 
3901  Polymers of ethylene, in primary forms  58.0 54.0  -3.6  4.4    49.1  -8.3  8.9 
6110  Jerseys, pullovers, cardigans, etc  93.0 94.0  0.5  19.2    85.5  -4.2  7.5 
                 
Source: Own calculations, ITC, based on COMTRADE data of the UNSD.             
Notes: 1) Only include trade with reporting countries; 2) Defined as 100*(M-T)/(T+M), T: reported trade, M: Mirror estimate; 3) Assumed freight and insurance difference of 10%. 
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Table 7 
Croatia: Faked Invoicing in 2001 Imports, by main countries of origin 
               
  Import
1)  Mirror
1)  Discrepancy  Partner country    Mirror  Discrepancy  Illegal  Product groups with 
  Cif  estimate, fob  (total)
2)  vs world    estimate, cif
3)  (cif adj.)  Imports  highest discrepancies 
  USD mn  USD mn  %  %    USD mn  %  USD mn  HS 4-digit code 
               
TOTAL  8,292.10 7,049.80  8.1  .  7754.8  3.3  -537.3   
                SLOVENIA  711.3 796.6  -5.7  -0.1  876.3  -10.4  165.0  3004 ,8516 ,9403 ,4818 
ITALY  1,524.1 1,508.1  0.5  -4.3  1658.9  -4.2  134.8  8703 ,9403 ,6110 ,2901 
AUSTRIA  630.7 666.6  -2.8  -2.8  733.3  -7.5  102.6  8517 ,6406 
NETHERLANDS  163.1 208.4  -12.2  2.2  229.2  -16.9  66.1  8473 ,8471 ,2203 ,3004 
POLAND  176.0 97.1  28.9  -1.7  106.8  24.5  -69.2  8901 ,8906 ,8703 ,9401 
GERMANY  1,546.5 1,335.6  7.3  0.3  1469.2  2.6  -77.3  8703 ,8704 ,3004 
UNTD. KINGDOM  225.7 117.3  31.6  -1.2  129.0  27.3  -96.7  2716 ,8429 ,8703 ,8471 
JAPAN  144.0 7.9  89.6  6.8  8.7  88.6  -135.3  8517 ,8521 ,9009 ,8525 
USA  296.9 97.5  50.6  8.0  107.3  46.9  -189.7  8408 ,2941 ,8703 ,8471 
RUSSIAN FED.  653.4 378.5  26.6  9.7  416.4  22.2  -237.1  2709 ,2711 
                Source: Own calculations, ITC, based on COMTRADE data of the UNSD.         
Notes: 1) Only include trade with reporting countries; 2) Defined as 100*(T-M)/(M+T), T: reported trade, M: Mirror estimate; 3) Assumed freight and insurance difference of 10%. 
Table 8 
Croatia: Faked Invoicing in 2001 Imports, by main product groups 
                 
    Import
1)  Mirror
1)  Discrepancy  Discrepancy    Mirror  Discrepancy  Illegal 
    cif  estimate, fob  (total)
2)  (total), World    estimate, cif
3)  (cif adj.)  Imports 
    USD mn  USD mn  %  %    USD mn  %  USD mn 
                 
HS  Total  8,292.1 7,049.8  8.1  4.6    7754.8  3.3  -537.3 
                 
8517 Electric app f. line telephony,incl curr line system  82.0 114.9  -16.7  6.9    126.4  -21.3  44.4 
6110 Jerseys, pullovers, cardigans, etc  57.3 82.6  -18.1  19.2    90.9  -22.7  33.6 
9403 Other furniture and parts thereof   92.1 109.2  -8.5  2.6    120.1  -13.2  28.0 
3004 Medicament mixtures (not 3002, 3005, 3006)  168.3 176.6  -2.4  1.0    194.3  -7.2  26.0 
8415 Air conditioning machines, motor-driven elem.  61.0 25.7  40.7  1.8    28.3  36.7  -32.7 
8471 Automatic data processing machines  170.9 110.9  21.3  5.6    122.0  16.7  -48.9 
2716 Electrical energy   91.2 11.4  77.8  2.4    12.5  75.8  -78.7 
2709 Crude petroleum oils  432.5 255.7  25.7  23.0    281.3  21.2  -151.2 
8703 Cars (incl. station wagon)  627.8 426.2  19.1  1.4    468.8  14.5  -159.0 
8901 Cruise ship, cargo ship, barges  201.6 2.1  98.0  -53.5    2.3  97.7  -199.3 
                 
Source: Own calculations, ITC, based on COMTRADE data of the UNSD.             
Notes: 1) Only include trade with reporting countries; 2) Defined as 100*(T-M)/(M+T), T: reported trade, M: Mirror estimate; 3) Assumed freight and insurance difference of 10%. 
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Illegal exports are calculated as the difference between the fob export data of the home 
country and the cif adjusted mirror estimate. Assuming the underinvoicing of imports to be 
the main factor of discrepancy we expect a positive sign. Similarly, illegal imports are 
calculated as the difference between the cif adjusted mirror estimates and the cif import 
data of the home country. Again, assuming the underinvoicing of imports to be the main 
factor of discrepancy we expect a positive sign. Each table shows the described data for 
the ten largest illegal trade flows. 
 
However, looking at table 1 and 2 on faked invoicing in Albanian 2001 exports by main 
countries of destination and by main product groups respectively, we observe a negative 
number for total illegal exports due to underinvoicing of imports in the partner countries. 
This implies that the Albanian export data is showing lower values than the cif adjusted 
partner-countries’ import data. Given the fact that most of Albania’s trading partners are EU 
countries and that the EU has granted Albania in 2000 Autonomous Trade Concessions 
(ATCs), liberalising 95% of the exports to the EU, incentives for underinvoicing EU imports 
from Albania might be reduced and underinvoicing of Albanian exports might be a way of 
decreasing export generated income with respect to Albanian corporate income taxation. It 
is also important to note, that the cif adjusted discrepancy indicator is not very high and 
that a negative illegal exports figure might be as well due to sloppy Albanian customs 
registration. Moreover Albanian trade flows are in general relatively low which implies that 
only a few mistakes in customs registration might cause changes in discrepancy indicators. 
 
Nevertheless, the remaining EU trade barriers against Albania are tariff quotas on imports 
of wine, baby beef and certain fishery products and some NTBs in the textile industry
2. 
This seems to be important when analysing the structure of the top ten HS 4-digit product 
groups which display illegal exports. Most of them are textiles either under an EU double-
checking licensing regime or/and a special EU rule of origin regime, which could explain 
faked invoicing of EU imports from Albania in these product groups. Some of the other 
product groups where illegal exports might have been detected include such sensitive 
products as for example jewellery and ‘medicinal plants”, which includes e.g. coca and 
poppy. These last two product groups seem to be related to trade with Switzerland, which 
is one of the important illegal export destinations for Albania. 
 
Looking at Albanian import data and its partner countries’ statistics (table 3 & 4) a cif 
adjusted discrepancy of almost 0% can be observed at the aggregate level. However, for 
certain countries of origin (notably Italy and Greece) and for certain product groups (TV 
cameras and petroleum oils) underinvoicing of imports leads to somewhat more substantial 
illegal imports. Interestingly enough, in the group of products where  import overinvoicing 
can be assumed, electrical energy (2716) is the most important one accounting for more 
                                                                 
2   The information on sensitive EU textiles is taken from Croatian sources (http://eicc.biznet.hr/tekstil/upute.htm). The 
author assumes that the rules applied to Croatia are similar for other West Balkan countries too.   12
than USD 50 mn without being mentioned in any of the mirror accounts in the trade 
partner-countries. The biggest part of Albanian state subventions are realised in the energy 
sector which might explain an economic incentive for the overinvoicing of imports. Other 
important products in this group are cars (USD -22 mn) and trucks (USD -8 mn). 
 
While illegal trade due to faked invoicing of imports seems to be pretty outbalanced in the 
case of Albania, Croatia appears to be strongly involved in illegal exports (see tables 5 & 6) 
with an estimated volume of more than USD 700 mn. Main countries of destination being 
Italy, Germany and Austria. By far the most important product group in this respect is 8901: 
Ships for the transport of persons and goods. About 90% of the value of this export item 
‘disappears” in the partner countries’ import data. However, as can be seen from the world 
wide discrepancy in this product group (about 50%), this is a relatively common feature. In 
this case overinvoicing of exports might be an explanation too. Ship building in Croatia is 
heavily subsidised. Other important illegal exports due to an assumed underinvoicing of 
imports in the partner countries can be detected in the product groups 2711 Petroleum 
gases (USD 55 mn) and 0302 Fresh fish (USD 30 mn). The first group is typically excised 
and the second underlies in many countries an import quota regulation (this is also the 
case for the remaining EU trade barriers in the ATCs for the West Balkan countries). 
 
Turning to faked invoicing in Croatia’s 2001 imports (in tables 7 & 8) reveals a relatively low 
cif adjusted discrepancy figure for the aggregate imports. Still there seems t o be a 
considerable amount of underinvoiced imports from some of the EU-15 countries 
(especially Italy and Austria) and Slovenia with which Croatia had a Free Trade Agreement 
(FTA) at that time. Most important product groups with the highest illegal imports due to 
underinvoicing were telephone sets (USD 44 mn), Jerseys and pullovers (USD 34 mn) and 
Other furniture (e.g. for offices and kitchen - USD 28 mn). While in general Croatian tariffs 
are relatively low, the last two product groups were protected by above average tariffs. 
Telephone sets were not protected by tariffs at all. Even more puzzling is the fact that there 
is a substantial amount of overinvoicing of imports (or underinvoicing of exports from the 
side of the partner-countries) in the following product groups: 8901 Ships (USD 200 mn), 
8703 Cars (USD 160 mn), 2709 Crude petroleum oils (USD 150 mn), 2716 Electrical 
energy (USD 80 mn), 8471 Automatic data processing machines (USD 50 mn), 8415 Air 
conditioning machines (USD 30 mn), 2711 Petroleum gases (USD 20 mn). It would be 
interesting to know who were the actual importers (or partner-country exporters) of these 
goods (e.g. private or public, etc.) in order to understand better the economic rationale 
behind that. As the Russian Federation shows the largest (‘negative’) illegal import flow in 
2001, which is mainly related to crude petroleum oils it might also be that there is an 
economic incentive for Russian exporters to underinvoice because of still existing foreign 
exchange control measures and capital flight.   13 
Table 9 
Macedonia: Faked Invoicing in 2001 Exports, by main countries of destination 
                 
  Export
1)  Mirror
1)  Discrepancy  Partner country    Mirror  Discrepancy  Illegal  Product groups with 
  Fob  estimate, cif  (total)
2)  vs world    estimate, fob
3)  (cif adj.)  Exports  highest discrepancies 
  USD mn  USD mn  %  %    USD mn  %  USD mn  HS 4-digit code 
                 
TOTAL  836.1  775.2 -3.8  .    704.7  -8.5  131.4  . 
                 
CROATIA  58.2  0.0 -100.0  8.1    0.0  -100.0  58.2  2204 ,3004 ,7208 ,7306 
SWITZERLAND  40.4  10.1 -60.1  1.0    9.2  -63.0  31.2  2603 ,2710 ,7103 ,7208 
GREECE  100.7  76.7 -13.5  -1.0    69.7  -18.2  31.0  6304 ,6302 ,6206 ,2401 
GERMANY  237.1  248.5 2.3  -1.1    225.9  -2.4  11.2  6109 ,8544 ,7208 ,2204 
BELGIUM  7.3  0.8 -79.5  8.2    0.7  -81.9  6.6  2401 ,2620 ,3105 ,6204 
USA  99.5  103.0 1.7  5.5    93.6  -3.0  5.9  6403 ,6405 ,6201 ,6203 
PANAMA  5.1  0.0 -100.0  -66.9    0.0  -100.0  5.1  2607 ,2608 ,7801 ,7901 
ALBANIA  9.9  15.0 20.4  4.5    13.6  15.9  -3.7  3901 ,2207 ,8537 ,0808 
ITALY  88.4  103.0 7.6  5.6    93.6  2.9  -5.2  6405 ,4407 ,7209 ,6403 
EGYPT  1.2  10.4 79.0  -17.7    9.5  77.5  -8.3  7210 ,2401 ,4407 ,8708 
                  Source: Own calculations, ITC, based on COMTRADE data of the UNSD.           
Notes: 1) Only include trade with reporting countries; 2) Defined as 100*(M-T)/(T+M), T: reported trade, M: Mirror estimate; 3) Assumed freight and insurance difference of 10%. 
Table 10 
Macedonia: Faked Invoicing in 2001 Exports, by main product groups 
                 
    Export
1)  Mirror
1)  Discrepancy  Discrepancy    Mirror  Discrepancy  Illegal 
    fob  estimate, cif  (total)
2)  (total), World    estimate, fob
3)  (cif adj.)  Exports 
    USD mn  USD mn  %  %    USD mn  %  USD mn 
                 
HS  Total  836.1 775.2  -3.8  4.6    704.7  -8.5  131.4 
                 
7208 Flat-rolld products of iron/non-al/s wdth>/=6cm, hr  82.3 56.0  -19.0  4.6    50.9  -23.6  31.4 
7901 Unwrought zinc  49.3 30.6  -23.3  7.5    27.8  -27.9  21.5 
7210 Flat-rolled prod of iron or non-al/s wd>/=6cm, cr  28.5 16.1  -27.7  4.6    14.6  -32.1  13.9 
6405 Footwear, nes  14.9 2.3  -73.1  -4.1    2.1  -75.4  12.8 
6203 Men's suits, jackets, trousers etc & shorts  41.7 32.4  -12.5  0.1    29.5  -17.2  12.2 
6206 Women's blouses & shirts  59.6 55.0  -4.0  10.9    50.0  -8.8  9.6 
8544 Insulated wire/cable  22.5 14.9  -20.3  6.2    13.5  -24.8  9.0 
6205 Men's shirts  64.5 63.9  -0.4  4.2    58.1  -5.2  6.4 
3004 Medicament mixtures (not 3002, 3005, 3006)  10.8 5.4  -33.7  1.0    4.9  -37.5  5.9 
6403 Footwear, upper of leather  13.4 28.8  36.5  11.0    26.2  32.3  -12.8 
                 
Source: Own calculations, ITC, based on COMTRADE data of the UNSD.             
Notes: 1) Only include trade with reporting countries; 2) Defined as 100*(M-T)/(T+M), T: reported trade, M: Mirror estimate; 3) Assumed freight and insurance difference of 10%. 
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Table 11 
Macedonia: Faked Invoicing in 2001 Imports, by main countries of origin 
               
  Import
1)  Mirror
1)  Discrepancy  Partner country    Mirror  Discrepancy  Illegal  Product groups with 
  Cif  estimate, fob  (total)
2)  vs world    estimate, cif
3)  (cif adj.)  Imports  highest discrepancies 
  USD mn  USD mn  %  %    USD mn  %  USD mn  HS 4-digit code 
               
TOTAL  994.60 1,448.10  -18.6  .  1592.9  -23.1  598.3  . 
                GREECE  141.2 407.5  -48.5  -0.7  448.3  -52.1  307.1  2709 ,2710 ,2309 
GERMANY  98.5 217.8  -37.7  0.3  239.6  -41.7  141.1  7408 ,5208 ,5516 ,5407 
ITALY  77.7 154.7  -33.1  -4.3  170.2  -37.3  92.5  8802 ,6406 ,4104 ,3923 
TURKEY  28.7 89.4  -51.3  3.0  98.3  -54.8  69.6  6002 ,6305 ,4818 ,1704 
NETHERLANDS  16.5 52.3  -52.2  2.2  57.5  -55.4  41.0  5208 ,5514 ,6002 ,8702 
FRANCE  28.9 53.3  -29.6  0.4  58.6  -34.0  29.7  8471 ,2106 ,8704 ,8517 
SLOVENIA  116.4 130.5  -5.7  -0.1  143.6  -10.4  27.2  4418 ,9403 ,8517 ,3004 
HUNGARY  15.3 36.0  -40.2  2.5  39.6  -44.3  24.3  0401 ,8473 ,8542 ,0406 
CROATIA  46.0 0.0  100.0  -6.4  0.0  100.0  -46.0  1602 ,1604 ,1806 ,1905 
RUSSIAN FED.  137.1 29.9  64.2  9.7  32.9  61.3  -104.2  2709 ,7207 ,7208 ,8703 
                Source: Own calculations, ITC, based on COMTRADE data of the UNSD.         
Notes: 1) Only include trade with reporting countries; 2) Defined as 100*(T-M)/(M+T), T: reported trade, M: Mirror estimate; 3) Assumed freight and insurance difference of 10%. 
Table 12 
Macedonia: Faked Invoicing in 2001 Imports, by main product groups 
                 
    Import
1)  Mirror
1)  Discrepancy  Discrepancy    Mirror  Discrepancy  Illegal 
    cif  estimate, fob  (total)
2)  (total), World    estimate, cif
3)  (cif adj.)  Imports 
    USD mn  USD mn  %  %    USD mn  %  USD mn 
                 
HS  Total  994.6 1,448.1  -18.6  4.6    1592.9  -23.1  598.3 
                 
2710 Petroleum oils, not crude  58.1 85.4  -19.0  3.2    93.9  -23.6  35.8 
8703 Cars (incl. station wagon)  29.3 45.9  -22.1  1.4    50.5  -26.6  21.2 
8517 Electric app for line telephony,incl curr line system  8.5 18.4  -36.7  6.9    20.2  -40.8  11.7 
9403 Other furniture and parts thereof   5.5 11.3  -34.5  2.6    12.4  -38.7  6.9 
1701 Cane or beet sugar and chemically pure sucrose  11.9 14.9  -11.2  8.1    16.4  -15.9  4.5 
0207 Meat & edible offal of poultry meat  19.6 20.7  -2.9  -3.2    22.8  -7.5  3.2 
2713 Petroleum coke, petroleum bitumen & other res.  6.5 3.2  33.7  12.5    3.5  29.7  -3.0 
8479 Machines&mech appl having indiv functions, nes  8.1 4.3  30.9  -0.3    4.7  26.3  -3.4 
1005 Maize (corn)  8.4 3.6  40.4  6.6    4.0  35.9  -4.4 
2709 Crude petroleum oils  118.1 92.4  12.2  23.0    101.6  7.5  -16.5 
                 
Source: Own calculations, ITC, based on COMTRADE data of the UNSD.             
Notes: 1) Only include trade with reporting countries; 2) Defined as 100*(T-M)/(M+T), T: reported trade, M: Mirror estimate; 3) Assumed freight and insurance difference of 10%. 
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Table 13 
Romania: Faked Invoicing in 2001 Exports, by main countries of destination 
                 
  Export
1)  Mirror
1)  Discrepancy  Partner country    Mirror  Discrepancy  Illegal  Product groups with 
  Fob  estimate, cif  (total)
2)  vs world    estimate, fob
3)  (cif adj.)  Exports  highest discrepancies 
  USD mn  USD mn  %  %    USD mn  %  USD mn  HS 4-digit code 
                 
TOTAL  10230.1  11241.2 4.7  .    10219.3  -0.1  10.8  . 
                 
ITALY  2849.9  3006.8 2.7  5.6    2733.5  -2.1  116.4  6110 ,7601 ,6201 ,6203 
NETHERLANDS  384.2  328.6 -7.8  -12.1    298.7  -12.5  85.5  6405 ,6402 ,8517 ,2710 
HUNGARY  371.1  347.5 -3.3  7.1    315.9  -8.0  55.2  6110 ,6108 ,8473 ,6206 
MALTA  42.0  1.6 -92.5  -21.3    1.5  -93.3  40.5  2710 ,8901 ,7208 
AUSTRIA  341.4  337.5 -0.6  3.4    306.8  -5.3  34.6  8708 ,6204 ,9401 ,6203 
REP.MOLDOVA  110.9  93.0 -8.8  -16.1    84.5  -13.5  26.4  7204 ,7010 ,8517 ,4808 
UTD.KINGDOM  566.1  654.4 7.2  -0.3    594.9  2.5  -28.8  8542 ,6403 ,6201 ,8544 
BELGIUM  192.6  278.6 18.3  8.2    253.3  13.6  -60.7  7208 ,2710 ,6204 ,6110 
GERMANY  1779.1  2056.3 7.2  -1.1    1869.4  2.5  -90.3  6202 ,8708 ,6110 ,6205 
USA  355.7  547.3 21.2  5.5    497.5  16.6  -141.8  8517 ,6108 ,8525 ,6403 
                  Source: Own calculations, ITC, based on COMTRADE data of the UNSD.           
Notes: 1) Only include trade with reporting countries; 2) Defined as 100*(M-T)/(T+M), T: reported trade, M: Mirror estimate; 3) Assumed freight and insurance difference of 10%. 
Table 14 
Romania: Faked Invoicing in 2001 Exports, by main product groups 
                 
    Export
1)  Mirror
1)  Discrepancy  Discrepancy    Mirror  Discrepancy  Illegal 
    fob  estimate, cif  (total)
2)  (total), World    estimate, fob
3)  (cif adj.)  Exports 
    USD mn  USD mn  %  %    USD mn  %  USD mn 
                 
HS  Total  10,230.1 11,241.2  4.7  4.6    10219.3  -0.1  10.8 
                 
8901 Cruise ship, cargo ship, barges  182.4 59.7  -50.7  -53.5    54.3  -54.1  128.1 
6405 Footwear, nes  90.3 8.8  -82.2  -4.1    8.0  -83.7  82.3 
2710 Petroleum oils, not crude  372.8 325.4  -6.8  3.2    295.8  -11.5  77.0 
9403 Other furniture and parts thereof   397.0 359.6  -4.9  2.6    326.9  -9.7  70.1 
8708 Parts & access of motor vehicles   137.9 85.9  -23.2  2.4    78.1  -27.7  59.8 
6204 Women's suits, jackets,dresses skirts etc&shorts  739.8 882.4  8.8  6.3    802.2  4.0  -62.4 
6202 Women's overcoats, wind-jackets etc o/t 62.04  84.5 166.4  32.6  13.5    151.3  28.3  -66.8 
7601 Unwrought alumimum  109.7 194.2  27.8  3.6    176.5  23.4  -66.8 
6403 Footwear, upper of leather  476.3 609.5  12.3  11.0    554.1  7.5  -77.8 
6110 Jerseys, pullovers, cardigans, etc  215.8 373.2  26.7  19.2    339.3  22.2  -123.5 
                 
Source: Own calculations, ITC, based on COMTRADE data of the UNSD.             
Notes: 1) Only include trade with reporting countries; 2) Defined as 100*(M-T)/(T+M), T: reported trade, M: Mirror estimate; 3) Assumed freight and insurance difference of 10%. 
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Table 15 
Romania: Faked Invoicing in 2001 Imports, by main countries of origin 
               
  Import
1)  Mirror
1)  Discrepancy  Partner country    Mirror  Discrepancy  Illegal  Product groups with 
  Cif  estimate, fob  (total)
2)  vs world    estimate, cif
3)  (cif adj.)  Imports  highest discrepancies 
  USD mn  USD mn  %  %    USD mn  %  USD mn  HS 4-digit code 
               
TOTAL  13,893.7 12,968.2  3.4  .  14265.0  -1.3  371.3   
                GERMANY  2,363.6 2,719.3  -7.0  0.3  2991.2  -11.7  627.6  8544 ,8703 ,8704 ,8701 
HUNGARY  598.9 749.4  -11.2  2.5  824.3  -15.8  225.4  1001 ,3923 ,0203 ,0103 
ITALY  3,107.1 2,987.7  2.0  -4.3  3286.5  -2.8  179.4  6217 ,6406 ,2710 ,5407 
AUSTRIA  440.3 517.7  -8.1  -2.8  569.5  -12.8  129.2  4104 ,1701 ,3004 ,8547 
BELGIUM  255.6 316.2  -10.6  -14.4  347.8  -15.3  92.2  8479 ,8703 ,3004 ,8701 
NETHERLANDS  321.4 367.6  -6.7  2.2  404.4  -11.4  83.0  8703 ,8471 ,8473 ,3004 
AUSTRALIA  85.7 22.3  58.7  14.6  24.5  55.5  -61.2  2606 ,3920 ,4907 ,2701 
USA  494.0 352.5  16.7  8.0  387.8  12.0  -106.3  2402 ,8802 ,8471 ,8525 
JAPAN  153.1 10.0  87.7  6.8  11.0  86.6  -142.1  5516 ,8452 ,8473 ,8532 
RUSSIAN FED.  1,183.4 748.5  22.5  9.7  823.4  17.9  -360.1  2709 ,2701 ,7207 ,2710 
                Source: Own calculations, ITC, based on COMTRADE data of the UNSD.         
Notes: 1) Only include trade with reporting countries; 2) Defined as 100*(T-M)/(M+T), T: reported trade, M: Mirror estimate; 3) Assumed freight and insurance difference of 10%. 
Table 16 
Romania: Faked Invoicing in 2001 Imports, by main product groups 
                 
    Import
1)  Mirror
1)  Discrepancy  Discrepancy    Mirror  Discrepancy  Illegal 
    cif  estimate, fob  (total)
2)  (total), World    estimate, cif
3)  (cif adj.)  Imports 
    USD mn  USD mn  %  %    USD mn  %  USD mn 
                 
HS  Total  13,893.7 12,968.2  3.4  4.6    14265.0  -1.3  371.3 
                 
8703 Cars (incl. station wagon)  220.9 435.9  -32.7  1.4    479.5  -36.9  258.6 
6406 Part of footwear;romovable in-soles,etc  205.9 353.2  -26.4  2.0    388.5  -30.7  182.6 
6217 Clothing accessories nes; o/t of hd 62.12  123.8 239.3  -31.8  4.5    263.2  -36.0  139.4 
8544 Insulated wire/cable  176.0 259.0  -19.1  6.2    284.9  -23.6  108.9 
8517 Electric app for line telephony,incl curr line system  218.5 267.6  -10.1  6.9    294.4  -14.8  75.9 
8704 Trucks, motor vehicles for the transport of goods  89.2 136.2  -20.9  3.0    149.8  -25.4  60.6 
9018 Electro-medical apparatus  96.7 131.0  -15.1  0.3    144.1  -19.7  47.4 
4104 Leather of bovine/equine animal, o/t 4108/4109  412.0 326.8  11.5  4.2    359.5  6.8  -52.5 
2701 Coal; briquettes, ovoids & similar solid fuels  165.7 66.9  42.5  10.9    73.6  38.5  -92.1 
2709 Crude petroleum oils  554.5 238.0  39.9  23.0    261.8  35.9  -292.7 
                 
Source: Own calculations, ITC, based on COMTRADE data of the UNSD.             
Notes: 1) Only include trade with reporting countries; 2) Defined as 100*(T-M)/(M+T), T: reported trade, M: Mirror estimate; 3) Assumed freight and insurance difference of 10%. 
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In the case of Macedonian illegal trade flows it seems that the underinvoicing of imports (or 
the overinvoicing of exports) is the main type of faking invoices in both directions. 
Aggregate illegal exports due to underinvoicing of imports in the partner-countries (or the 
overinvoicing of exports in Macedonia) stood 2001 at about USD 130 mn. Main countries 
of destination (see table 9) were Croatia (USD 60 mn), Switzerland and Greece (with both 
about USD 30 mn). Major product groups for illegal trade (see table 10) were iron and zinc 
products (7208, 7901, 7210). The metal industry is one of the manufacturing branches 
where Macedonia is specialised in. An EU double-checking license regime has been 
established inter alia for Macedonian steel products 7208 and 7210. Several of the other 
important product groups are textile products. For possible explanations for this see the 
section on Albanian exports above. 
 
Underinvoicing of imports is especially strong in the case of Macedonian 2001 imports as 
compared with the mirror estimates. The cif adjusted discrepancy indicator is high, 
resulting in some USD 600 mn of illegal imports. Most important countries of origin (see 
table 11) were Greece (USD 300 mn), Germany (USD 140 mn) and Italy (USD 90 mn). 
Major product groups (see table 12) were 2710 Petroleum oils, not crude (USD 36 mn), 
8703 Cars (USD 21 mn) and 8517 Telephone sets (USD 12 mn). Though Macedonia has 
FTAs with almost all the countries in the region, tariff rates for imports from the EU are still 
relatively high (7.3% on average)
3. Most of the product groups presented in table 12 carry 
even higher tariff rates, far above 10% for imports from the EU. Thus, in this case it seems 
to be reasonable to assume tariff avoidance as a major incentive for the underinvoicing of 
imports. Similar to the Croatian case, the major ‘negative’ illegal import flow (due to 
overinvoicing of imports and/or underinvoicing of exports) is in crude petroleum oils from 
Russia. 
 
In Romania export discrepancies are not worthwhile mentioning on the aggregate level. 
Nevertheless there seems to be some underinvoicing of imports in Romanian trade-
partner-countries especially in the case of exports to Italy, the Netherlands and Romania’s 
neighbour Hungary (see table 13). Important product groups in illegal exports (see table 
14) are as in the case of Croatia 2710 Ships for transport of persons and goods (USD 128 
mn), 6405 Footwear (USD 6405 mn) and 2710 Petroleum oils, not crude (USD 77 mn). 
Interestingly, the major item where either underinvoicing of Romanian exports or 
overinvoicing of the partner-countries’ imports has to be assumed is the product group 
6110 Jerseys and pullovers with more than USD 120 mn of difference. 
 
On the import side the aggregate picture is similar to the export side with relatively 
outbalanced but slightly positive illegal trade flows. Here the biggest illegal imports due to 
assumed underinvoicing stem from (see table 15) Germany (USD 630 mn), Hungary (USD 
230 mn) and Italy (USD 180 mn). The opposite case of underinvoicing of exports might be 
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again observed for the imports from the Russian Federation (USD 360 mn, mainly due to 
trade in various petroleum products). Table 16 presents the top ten product groups in 
illegal imports. The highest values (apart from crude petroleum oils: USD -290 mn) can be 
observed for 8703 Cars (USD 260 mn), 6406 Parts of footwear (USD 180 mn) and 6217 
Clothing accessories (USD 140 mn). Romania is generally a highly tariff protected country. 
However under the Europe Agreement Romania was 2001 already phasing out tariffs on 
products originating within the EU. 
 
Looking at the results so far and just comparing the total discrepancy figures of the SEE 
countries with the figures for the total discrepancy on the world level we can try to assess 
whether and to which extent illegal trade due to faked invoicing is different in the Balkans. 
The aggregate picture shows that both Romanian exports and imports are close to the 
4.6% world discrepancy level. Similarly, Albanian total imports fit the world average. 
However, Albanian, Croatian and Macedonian exports as well as Croatian and 
Macedonian imports display discrepancy figures that are either more than double the size 
of the world average and/or of a different sign. This would support the widespread belief 
that the Balkans are a stronghold of illegal trade. When it comes to single SEE product 
groups, the following can be identified as being traded illegally above the world average: 
textiles & footwear, petroleum, cars & trucks, ships, sugar, medicine and electronics. 
 
This mix of goods is also confirmed by every day’s newspaper articles in local press on this 
topic. As for instance Kavain (2003) writes about faked invoicing of textiles and consumer 
electronics at Croatian border stations. Kavain describes a network of phantom companies 
and corrupt customs officers organising illegal trade. One example concerns a group of 
Croatian bogus companies which declared for years the import of cheap textiles from 
Bulgaria and Romania for which FTA’s foresee a zero tariff rate. However, when the 
Croatian customs recently controlled the cargo they found luxury trade marks’ polo shirts of 
Paul & Shark and Lacoste, not produced neither in Bulgaria nor Romania. The shirts were 
declared to be worth 0.14 Euro each. In the wake of the investigations for this case police 
found out about another case of illegal trade with consumer electronics (TV sets, mobile 
phones, etc.). In both cases a chief of t he office for the fight against counterfeits was 
suspected to be involved. The consumer electronics were mostly bought from Irish and US 
off shore companies. These goods were formally imported by Croatian companies which 
either do not exist at all or just maintain a mailing address. Upon import the goods were 
immediately taken over by big retail companies. Police found out that Slovenian customs 
received upon the exit from Slovenia the correct invoices indicating the true Croatian 
importers. However, upon e ntering Croatia the falsified invoices were presented which 
indicated the invented firms as the importer. This is just as to provide some insights into the 
concrete practices of faked invoicing in the Balkans. While in the first case an 
underinvoicing of imports occurs and could be also detected in our calculations, the second   19
case would not result in any discrepancy between domestic and partner country statistics, 
rather the Croatian state would be cheated out of customs revenue. 
 
As it was already mentioned above, the analysis so far had to restrict at to Albania, Croatia, 
Macedonia and Romania because Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria and Serbia and 
Montenegro were not included in the COMTRADE database as provided by ITC. Given 
that especially Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as Serbia and Montenegro are important 
trading partners for Croatia and Macedonia respectively we shall investigate in addition to 
the analysis above the bilateral trade flows as provided directly by the customs offices of 
Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina as a supplementary case study. 
 
Tables 17 and 18 show the main product groups where faked invoicing of the importing 
country can be assumed both in the exports from Croatia to Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
vice versa respectively. The data stems from the year 2002. The last column exhibits the 
average tariff protection of the importing country with regard to the single HS 4 -digit 
product groups. In the first case illegal Croatian exports due to assumed underinvoicing at 
the Bosnian customs concentrate in the following product groups: 2710 Petroleum oils, not 
crude (USD 40 mn), 2402 Cigarettes (USD 13 mn) and 3004 Medicament mixtures (USD 5 
mn). While the average tariff rate is not necessarily very high for those products (with the 
exception of cigarettes), e.g. excise taxes for fuels and tobacco and licensing regulations 
for medicaments could explain the incentive to underinvoice. The aggregate cif adjusted 
discrepancy figure is fairly balanced. The most blatant discrepancies where either Croatian 
underinvoicing or Bosnian overinvoicing has to be assumed are 1701 Sugar (USD 15 mn), 
7207 Semi-finished products of iron or non-alloy steel (USD 10 mn) and interestingly 0803 
Bananas (USD 9 mn). In the case of such goods as Bananas which are definitely not 
produced in Croatia it can be assumed that the discrepancy can be attributed to the fact 
that Croatian ports were used for the transit and Bosnian customs did not register the true 
country of origin. 
 
When looking at the opposite trade flow an even lower relevance of underinvoicing by the 
importing side can be observed. There are some illegal Bosnian exports in the product 
groups 4407 Wood sawn (USD 8 mn), due to underinvoicing of the importer and there is 
an important illegal export flow due to overinvoicing of the importer (or the underinvoicing 
of the exporter) in aluminium (USD –24 mn). As Bosnian trade flows are in general very 
low we are probably observing in many cases only a few (if not in some cases only single) 
trade transactions per product group which obviously can result in a higher error 
probability. Moreover the incentives for the underinvoicing of imports is relatively low as 
Croatia is granting Bosnian exporters 0% tariff rates for all goods.   20 
Table 17 
Croatia: Faked Invoicing in 2002 Exports to Bosnia and Herzegovina, by main product groups 
                   
    Export
1)  Mirror
1)  Discrepancy    Mirror  Discrepancy  Illegal    Average 
    fob  estimate, cif  (total)
2)    estimate, fob
3)  (cif adj.)  Exports    tariff rate 
    USD mn  USD mn  %    USD mn  %  USD mn    % 
                   
HS  Total  704.4  783.6 5.3    712.4  0.6  -7.9    3.7 
                   
2710 Petroleum oils, not crude  154.5  126.0 -10.2    114.5  -14.9  40.0    2.4 
2402 Cigars, cheroots, cigarillos & cigarettes   58.0  49.2 -8.2    44.7  -13.0  13.3    9.0 
3004 Medicament mixtures (not 3002, 3005, 3006)  15.1  10.7 -17.1    9.7  -21.7  5.4    1.4 
6905 Roofing tiles, chimney -pots & oth.ceramic.constr.g.  11.4  9.8 -7.5    8.9  -12.3  2.5    3.0 
8471 Automatic data processing machines  9.4  13.1 16.6    11.9  11.9  -2.5    3.0 
8525 Television camera, transmissn app for radiotel.  0.9  4.2 63.1    3.8  60.2  -2.9    3.0 
8703 Cars (incl. station wagon)  0.1  7.0 96.4    6.3  96.0  -6.2    6.3 
0803 Bananas  0.0  9.7 99.9    8.8  99.9  -8.8    3.0 
7207 Semi-finished products of iron or non-alloy steel  0.4  10.9 92.2    9.9  91.5  -9.5    2.7 
1701 Cane or beet sugar and chemically pure sucrose  0.3  16.7 96.9    15.2  96.6  -14.9    6.0 
                    Source: Own calculations, national customs offices.               
Notes: 1) Only include trade with reporting countries; 2) Defined as 100*(M-T)/(T+M), T: reported trade, M: Mirror estimate; 3) Assumed freight and insurance difference of 10%. 
Table 18 
Bosnia and Herzegovina: Faked Invoicing in 2002 Exports to Croatia, by main product groups 
                   
    Export
1)  Mirror
1)  Discrepancy    Mirror  Discrepancy  Illegal    Average 
    fob  estimate, cif  (total)
2)    estimate, fob
3)  (cif adj.)  Exports    tariff rate 
    USD mn  USD mn  %    USD mn  %  USD mn    % 
                   
HS  Total  143.4  166.4 7.4    151.2  2.6  -7.8    0.0 
                   
4407 Wood sawn/chipped lengthwise, sliced/peeled  26.6  20.7 -12.4    18.8  -17.1  7.8    0.0 
8601 Rail locomotives powered by electricity  1.4  0.0 -100.0    0.0  -100.0  1.4    0.0 
8429 Self-propelled bulldozers, angledozers, etc.  1.6  0.6 -48.3    0.5  -51.9  1.1    0.0 
8425 Pulley tackle and hoists other than skip hoists  1.1  0.0 -94.7    0.0  -95.2  1.1    0.0 
6405 Other footwear  1.0  0.1 -73.9    0.1  -75.9  0.8    0.0 
6109 T-shirts, singlets and other vests, k/c  0.1  1.1 88.8    1.0  87.8  -0.9    0.0 
7308 Structures and parts of structures (o/t 9406)  2.9  4.2 19.0    3.9  14.4  -1.0    0.0 
6403 Footwear, upper of leather  0.3  1.5 64.9    1.4  62.1  -1.1    0.0 
9401 Seat (o/t dentists' & barbers' chairs, etc), &part  4.8  7.0 18.6    6.4  14.0  -1.6    0.0 
7601 Unwrought aluminium  10.6  37.9 56.3    34.4  52.9  -23.8    0.0 
                    Source: Own calculations, national customs offices.               
Notes: 1) Only include trade with reporting countries; 2) Defined as 100*(M-T)/(T+M), T: reported trade, M: Mirror estimate; 3) Assumed freight and insurance difference of 10%. 
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In order to conclude this section of the paper we shall try to give a crude estimate of the 
overall impact of faked invoicing in the Balkans. Therefore we use the data on exports and 
imports by countries as provided above for Albania, Croatia, Macedonia and Romania. In a 
first step we calculated shares of illegal trade volumes due to over- and underinvoicing of 
exports and imports respectively country by country by summing up positive and negative 
entries of the 35 most important trade destinations. We could have done the same by 
products, however the implicit assumption is that a partner country has a similar trade 
regime for most of the product groups (i.e. rather restrictive or liberal trade policy). In a 
second step we calculated weighted shares and applied it to total 2003 export and import 
data of all the seven SEE countries (thus including intraregional trade flows). The results 
are the following. 
 
We estimate about 11% of SEE-7 exports (or USD 3.8 bn) to be related to the 
underinvoicing from the side of the partner countries (or overinvoicning of domestic 
exports). Radically speaking this would imply that either partner country statistics are too 
low or official domestic export figures are too high. At the same time we estimate some 4% 
(or USD 1.4 bn) to be related to the overinvoicing from the side of the partner country (or 
underinvoicing of domestic exports). 
 
Similarly we have calculated the shares for SEE-7 imports. Here, we found a share of 
approximately 12% of SEE-7 imports (or USD 7.9 bn) to be related to domestic 
underinvoicing ( or overinvoicing of partner country exports) and  about 10% of SEE 
imports (or USD 6.5 bn) to be related to domestic overinvoicing (or underinvoicing of 
partner country exports). The radical consequences would be that either local import 
statistics are too low or partner country exports statistics are too high in the first case and 
vice versa in the second case. However, all these figures have to be treated with utmost 
caution as they are based on relatively strong assumptions. Ideally one would need data 
on each single trade flow by product and country to estimate ‘correct’ figures. 
 
 
2.2. Measuring Smuggling in South East Europe 
 
With the help of the partner-country-data technique it can be possible to detect a 
considerable part of the illegal trade due to faked invoicing. However, this method will not 
help to detect the magnitude of smuggling trade as smuggling bypasses the legal trade 
channels altogether. This is also the reason why it is much more difficult to make any 
quantitative statements about the size of smuggling and its overall economic importance. 
   22
Most methods have to restrict to single goods using good specific data. Pioneering articles 
in this field of research are the papers by Simkin (1970) and Richter (1970) on Indonesian 
smuggling trade in rubber using e.g. production and inventory data for estimating the ‘true’ 
export of rubber. Given the limitations of the methods for the estimation of smuggling in 
general we shall focus in this research on the smuggling trade in one good notoriously 
smuggled all across the Balkans – cigarettes. 
 
There is a host of literature on tobacco smuggling. Merriman (2001) provides e.g. a toolkit 
to ‘Understand, Measure, and Combat Tobacco Smuggling’. He suggests various methods 
how to detect tobacco smuggling (asking experts, observing smokers and their buying 
habits, monitoring tobacco trade, comparing tobacco sales against consumption via 
surveys, comparing tobacco sales against consumption via modelling and calculations).  
 
Inspired by this we will develop in the following our own method to detect the volume of 
cigarette smuggling in South East Europe using quantity data of official production, exports 
and imports as well as information from national household surveys on the amount of 
cigarette consumption. We shall start with the following identity: 
 
TCC=OCP+UCP–OCE–UCE+OCI+UCI,  (3) 
 
where TCC is the Total (domestic) Consumption of Cigarettes, OCP and UCP are the 
Official and the Unofficial Cigarette Production respectively, OCE and UCE are the Official 
and the Unofficial Cigarette Exports and where finally OCI and UCI are the Official and the 
Unofficial Cigarette Imports respectively. Transforming this leads us to the following 
equation: 
 
ITBC-UCP=OCP-OCE+OCI-TCC,  (4) 
 
where ITBC is the Illegal Trade Balance of Cigarettes (due to smuggling) which is equal to 
the difference between UCE and UCI. Applying official data on production, exports and 
imports as well as household survey data on cigarette consumption
4 in real quantities (i.e. 
cigarette sticks – in order to rule out the problem of under- and/or over- invoicing) to the 
right hand side of equation 4 should give us a result for the term ITBC-UCP, which can be 
seen as a lower bound estimate of the cigarette smuggling trade balance. This estimate 
does not include transit smuggling. It is probably fair to assume Unofficial Cigarette 
Production (UCP) to be relatively low
5 given the fact that tobacco manufacturing in most 
                                                                 
4   Estimating TCC with the help of data from national household surveys has certainly several flaws. One of them is the 
fact that this does not capture cigarette consumption due to (partly) legal cross-border shopping and legal tourist 
shopping (and it is doubtful whether this is included in the OCE data). This could somewhat distort the TCC estimates 
for Bulgaria and Croatia, being important tourism countries. However, for the purpose of this research we shall 
disregard this. 
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countries is performed by only a few mostly state owned producers. However, a high UCP 
would obviously decrease the cigarette smuggling trade balance estimate to some extent. 
 
For our research we have been using the official production and trade data as provided by 
ACS, WHO, IUAC, (2003) in their ‘Tobacco Control Country Profiles, Second Edition, 2003’ 
in millions of cigarette sticks for the years 1995 and 2000 for each
6 of the Balkan countries 
(see table 19). In order to estimate the total consumption of cigarettes we had to rely on 
Bulgarian household survey data which is the only source in SEE which provides cigarette 
consumption data in quantities
7 for the period from 1992 to present. 
 
According to this Bulgarians smoke 2.6 cigarettes per capita per day on average. This is 
actually a pretty stable figure over time, varying between 2.8 and 2.4 except for the 
economic crises year of 1997 when it was at only 1.6. Under the assumption that Bulgarian 
cigarette consumption patterns are representative for all the Balkan countries, we used the 
2.6 cigarettes per capita per day in order to calculate the Total Consumption of Cigarettes 
(TCC) for all the SEE countries. This assumption is being strengthened by 2001 data for 
Croatia (2.8) and Macedonia (2.7) expressed in money values and transformed into 
quantities by using the retail price of the Most Popular Price Category (MPPC) of cigarettes 
as provided by ACS, WHO, IUAC, (2003). Using this data in equation 4 results in ITBC-
UCP estimates for all the seven SEE countries for the years 1995 and 2000. 
 
Except for Albania in both years and Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995, all the Balkan 
countries are illegal net exporters of cigarettes due to smuggling. Albania has almost no 
cigarette production at all and Bosnia and Herzegovina had to suffer war in 1995. In four 
countries illegal net exports increased over time. Albania reduced its illegal imports as 
official cigarette imports were recorded in 2000. In Bosnia and Herzegovina official trade 
figures didn’t change a lot but post-war official production went up dramatically resulting in 
a shift from a illegal net importing country in 1995 to a illegal net exporting country in 2000. 
In fact the Bosnian net importer position in the 1990s is also supported by anecdotal 
evidence as described in Hajdinjak (2002) on the case of the so called ‘Capljina cigarettes’. 
Cigarettes produced in the Croatian tobacco factories of Rovinj and Zagreb were smuggled 
to the Herzegovinian border town of Capljina and subsequently sold all over Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. However, this business was closed down in 2000 after the investigation of 
the financial police. It is estimated that Bosnia and Herzegovina lost tens of millions USD 
because of unpaid sales and excise taxes on ‘Capljina cigarettes’. 
 
                                                                 
6   For Bulgaria and Romania the original data as provided by the National Statistical Office was used. 
7   Data provided in kg was transformed into cigarette sticks under the assumption that 1 cigarette sticks weighs 1 g.   24 
Table 19 
South East Europe: Cigarette Smuggling, 1995 & 2000 
                             
  Albania  Bosnia & Herz.  Bulgaria  Croatia  Macedonia  Romania  Serbia & Mont. 
  1995  2000  1995  2000  1995  2000  1995  2000  1995  2000  1995  2000  1995  2000 
                             
Total Consumption of Cigarettes (TCC)
1)  mn sticks  3083  3228  3473  3559  7485  7977  4431  4211  1866  1923  21524  21291  10009  7917 
Official Cigarette Production (OCP)  mn sticks  685  62  1500  4670  74603  26698  12110  13692  9664  9181  23000  33000  12686  14451 
Official Cigarette Exports (OCE)  mn sticks  .  5  .  .  60900  4000  1627  6117  1483  5675  78  71  .  100 
Official Cigarette Imports (OCI)  mn sticks  .  2260  .  25  200  200  12  34  218  130  22335  3474  100  2199 
                             
Illegal Trade Balance of Cigarettes (ITBC)  mn sticks  -2398  -911  -1973  1136  6418  14921  6064  3398  6533  1713  23733  15112  2777  8633 
less Unofficial Cigarette Production (UCP)                             
                             
ITBC-UCP in 2001 domestic net prices
2)  USD mn  -29.4  -11.2  -33.2  19.1  37.5  87.3  146.0  81.8  32.5  8.5  333.8  212.6  31.8  99.0 
                             
Source: Own calculations, National Statistical Offices, Tobacco Control Country Profiles 2nd Edition 2003.               
Notes: 1) Calculated for Bulgaria under the assumption that 1 cigarette stick = 1g, using data from household surveys.             
Due to non-availability of similar data for the other countries, average daily per capita consumption of cigarettes in Bulgaria 1992-2001 (2.6) was used in order to calculate TCC for the other countries. - 
2) Using the 2001 retail price of the Most Popular Price Category (MPPC) less excise and sales taxes.                 
 
Table 20 
Bulgaria: Cigarette Smuggling, 1992-2001 
                     
  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
                     
Total Consumption of Cigarettes (TCC)
1)  mn sticks  8473  8654  8387  7485  7249  4974  7384  8365  7977  7626 
Official Cigarette Production (OCP)  mn sticks  48558  32098  53664  74603  57333  30212  33181  25715  26698  26659 
Official Cigarette Exports (OCE)  mn sticks  38700  23100  43100  60900  40100  25700  10500  4000  4000  2400 
Official Cigarette Imports (OCI)  mn sticks  8300  9200  1700  200  300  200  100  100  200  217 
                     
Illegal Trade Balance of Cigarettes (ITBC)  mn sticks  9685  9544  3877  6418  10284  -262  15397  13450  14921  16850 
less Unofficial Cigarette Production (UCP)                     
                     
ITBC-UCP in 2001 domestic net prices
2)  USD mn  56.7  55.8  22.7  37.5  60.2  -1.5  90.1  78.7  87.3  98.6 
                     
Source: Own calculations, National Statistical Institute of Bulgaria, Tobacco Control Country Profiles 2nd Edition 2003.     
Notes: 1) Calculated under the assumption that 1 cigarette stick = 1g, using data from household surveys. -       
2) Using the 2001 retail price of the Most Popular Price Category (MPPC) less excise and sales taxes.         
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In the period 1995-2000 Bulgaria more than doubled its illegal net export position. Both 
official production as well as official cigarette exports  fell radically. However, official 
production fell by 64% while official exports even dropped by 93%. In Serbia and 
Montenegro illegal net export position even tripled though for other reasons. Here both 
official production and official imports increased over time. In Croatia, Macedonia and 
Romania the illegal trade balance of cigarettes deteriorated from 1995 to 2000. In the first 
two cases this was due to increased official cigarette exports. In the case of Romania the 
opposite holds true. Official imports dropped severely by 84%. 
 
On the regional level the Balkans were in 2000 in total illegal net exporters of about 44 bn 
cigarette sticks due to smuggling. In the last row of table 19 an effort was done to transform 
the quantity data into money values which is not a trivial task. This was done for each 
country separately using the 2001 retail price of the MPPC cigarettes less excise and sales 
taxes. The resulting 2001 net domestic price differs quite substantially across the region 
(from USD cent 0.5 per cigarette stick in Macedonia to USD cent 2.4 per cigarette stick in 
Croatia). This is probably due to the differences in quality, taxation, exchange rate and 
purchasing power among the SEE countries. However adding up the sums for the single 
countries leads to a total SEE illegal net export position in cigarette smuggling of close to 
USD 500 mn
8 in 2000. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that the above calculations 
did not involve transit smuggling, which is most probably an even more important factor at 
least for some countries in the Balkans. The case of Montenegro is well known in this 
respect (see e.g. Ivanovic (1999) on ‘Speedboats, Cigarettes, Mafia and Montenegrin 
Democracy’). Allegedly containers full of cigarettes were bought in the duty free zone of the 
Rotterdam harbour and smuggled via speedboats from Montenegro to the nearby Italian 
coast. In the 1990s, according to Italian sources Montenegro made up to 60% of its GDP 
from this ‘transit business’. 
 
As the Bulgarian Statistical Office’s yearbook offers all the necessary data for calculating 
ITBC-UCP from 1992 to 2001 we did also the same task as above for the full time series of 
Bulgaria only (see table 20). What can be seen from the data is that Bulgaria as a 
traditional tobacco growing country was an illegal net exporter of cigarettes over the whole 
period with the exception of the economic crises year of 1997 when it was an illegal net 
importer of cigarettes. This was also the year when official production and official exports 
dropped to a much lower level. From there on official production somewhat stabilised 
below 30 bn sticks per year while official cigarettes exports continuously fell until 2001 to 
an all time low of only 2.4 bn sticks. Official imports almost vanished already back in 1995. 
This resulted also in an all time high of about 17 bn cigarette sticks illegal net exports due 
to smuggling in 2001. Transformed in 2001 domestic net prices this figure reached almost 
USD 100 mn. 
                                                                 
8   Please remember that this is probably a lower bound estimate due to some non-observed unofficial cigarette 





The analysis of illegal trade flows is a tricky task and would require much more in detail 
information on the trade specifics of all the single goods involved (e.g. trade in ships). 
Under quite strong assumptions we have tried to make quantitative estimates of the 
magnitude of illegal trade in the Balkans. The results have shown that there are substantial 
illegal trade flows especially with those products and countries where tariff and non tariff 
barriers as well as high taxes are being applied. The effective reduction of the tariff burden 
through i llegal trade will lead to reduced price distortions and therefore welfare gains. 
However, especially developing countries are often very much dependent on tariff 
revenues in order to finance important public goods necessary for economic prosperity. 
 
 
3. Illegal Trade – Policy Issues 
 
Taxes and tariffs are prices for government services that are imposed by law. Unlike prices 
for private goods and services, those have to be paid by whoever they apply to on pain of 
punishment. Assuming that government services are demanded, there is clearly a price 
that a person or a firm would be ready to pay to acquire them. That can be called the 
voluntary price for public goods. The price imposed through taxes or tariffs
9  can be called 
an involuntary price. There are two issues to consider. One is the relationship between 
these two prices and the other is the mechanism that leads to the one or the other being in 
fact paid. We will look into the second issue first and then come back to the first issue. 
Finally, we will look into some possible policy issues when these reasoning is applied to 
the illegal trade in the Balkans. 
 
 
3.1. Taxes and Illegality 
 
Since Wicksell introduced the idea
10, it is usual to look at voluntary as compared to actual 
taxes. There are two ways to do that. One is to find the level of optimal taxation on the 
assumption that a mechanism for their collection exists. In other words, one assumes that, 
for instance, security is a good in demand and that people would be ready to pay for it 
voluntarily. As in the case  of the other goods, security would be supplied efficiently if 
                                                                 
9   Term tax will be used for all government imposed prices for its services, e.g., including tariffs. The term tariffs will be 
used when tariffs only are discussed. 
10   In Wicksell (1896).   27
marginal costs equalled marginal revenues, i.e., the desired level of security. That level of 
supply exists under usual assumptions. 
 
The other question is whether it can be reached. That is the question whether there is a 
mechanism, an institution, that reveals the preferences for public goods and thus sets the 
price at which the desired level of these goods is supplied. In principle, except in the case 
of a pure public good, which is more of an theoretical construct, that mechanism should be 
available. However, the costs of its use have to be considered too. This is the Coasian 
aspect of the problem
11. Once transaction costs are taken into consideration, it may be the 
case that involuntary taxes are preferable to the voluntary ones. 
 
Whose preference is that? This is an issue in preference aggregation. Assuming that they 
are aggregated democratically, then they say that majority prefers certain level of 
involuntary taxes to another one of voluntary taxes. Given that they are involuntary, there 
will be an incentive to avoid them, if that is possible. Thus, together with the decision of 
how much involuntary taxation there should be, a decision is taken as to how much tax 
avoidance there will be. This is the point made by Becker in his treatment of crime and 
punishment
12. Deciding to criminalize certain behaviour and determining the level of taxes 
to sustain certain level of coercion means determining the level of crime that one is ready 
to live with. 
 
Thus, once taxes are used it is accepted that there will exist a certain amount of informal 
activity. Under additional assumptions, the level of taxation should determine the level of 




3.2. The Level of Taxation 
 
The voluntary level of taxation could have a regulatory function in the sense that it would 
be equal to the involuntary one under a mechanism which would perfectly aggregate 
preferences for public goods and would involve the least amount of coercion. Sometimes, 
this is associated with the idea of a perfectly moral community. In such a community, 
people would reveal their true preferences for public goods and the amount of legal 
coercion would be minimal, indeed it would be zero. In other words, moral duty would take 
the role of the legal coercion
13.  
 
                                                                 
11   In Coase (1937). 
12   In Becker (1968). 
13   For a treatment see Laffont (1975).   28
In practice, however, actual levels of taxation could be lower or higher than the optimal 
level of taxation, which is the one that would be achieved if the taxes were paid voluntarily. 
Thus, there are three cases to consider: 
 
Case 1. Actual and optimal taxes are at the same level. 
In this case, the level of tax evasion should be zero because this case is possible only if it 
is indeed the voluntary rate of taxation that is being implemented. 
 
Case 2. Actual taxes are below voluntary taxes. 
In this case, the level of tax evasion cannot be attributed to the fact that there is over-
taxation, i.e., that government services are overpriced. Whatever tax evasion existed it 
would be attributable to the inefficiencies of the system of taxation and tax collection 
offices. 
 
Case 3. Actual taxes are higher than optimal taxes. 
This is probably the most important case. Certainly, in the case of prohibitive taxes, i.e., 
outlawed activities, optimal taxes are at most as high as the actual ones. In most other 
cases, it could be expected that the fact that taxes are levied involuntarily, they will tend to 
be higher because of the cost of tax evasion. Thus, the level of tax evasion would be 
determined by the profit to be made from tax evasion plus the incentive to avoid 
overpricing of government services. 
 
The identification of these cases is useful in order to be able to say something about the 
policy alternatives. Obviously, the level of taxation is not necessarily the crucial fact. The 




3.3. Free and Other Trade 
 
If public services could be purchased in the same way in which private goods and services 
are purchased, indirect taxation would not exist. As the mechanisms that would elicit 
optimal income taxation do not exist or are very difficult to implement, taxes are levied on 
what can be taxed. This applies particularly to trade both domestic and foreign. That is 
problematic from the point of view of the voluntary or free character of trade and also from 
the point of view of efficient allocation. It is not clear that individuals and firms would be 
ready to voluntarily pay sales taxes, excises or tariffs. As a consequence, in the case of 
these taxes it can be assumed that actual tax rates are always above the optimal ones. 
Thus, there will always exist incentives to evade taxes. 
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One way to deal with this problem is to introduce free trade wherever that is possible. This 
seems to be especially applicable to tariffs. In principle, tariffs are an instrument of 
protection rather than a fiscal instrument. This comes from the fact that those are levied on 
foreign trade and are thus not subject to the same type of consideration as other taxes. In 
a sense, all other taxes can be seen as considered together and as having effects on 
those who decide on taxes. In the case of tariffs, this is not the case. Two governments 
determine two different tariff rates with the aim of shifting the burden and the benefits 
asymmetrically. Therefore, the incentives to evade tariffs is even greater than in the case of 
other indirect taxes. Thus, it makes sense to argue for free trade across borders because it 
is very difficult to devise a scheme of optimal taxation in that case. 
 
 
3.4. Positive and Negative Rewards 
 
Given that optimal taxation is not really feasible, the issue is how to devise a system of 
taxation that would minimize the incentives to evasion. In general, positive and negative 
rewards could be used. In general equilibrium, those are substitutes. In a sense, Coases 
theorem could be formulated in the following way: 
 
Coases theorem on taxes: Taxes and subsidies are perfect substitutes. 
 
In the theory of trade, this is applicable to the tariffs and export subsidies. If all other 
barriers to trade can be expressed in tax equivalents, then all of them are substitutes. That 
is in particular the case with prohibitions. If, however, transaction costs are considered, 
then this symmetry is broken. There is a real choice between different types of rewards. In 
most cases, both positive and negative rewards will be used with the appropriate mix being 
rather difficult to determine. Clearly, if punishments (negative rewards) are costly to 
implement, positive rewards should be used more. 
 
In principle, that means that if fiscal efficiency is low, for whatever reason, then 
liberalization should be the preferred instrument. It may look otherwise when it comes to 
prohibitions. It may seem that if the tax system is not efficient, prohibitions should be used 
more often than lower taxes, simply because the prohibitions are easier to administer. 
Thus, on the border, it is often the case that non-tariff barriers are used because it is 
believed that those are easier to administer.  
 
In practice, precisely the opposite may be the case. Free trade may be the best policy to 
implement, because it requires the least amount of administrative resources. The key 
problem may be that an international agreement may be deemed necessary in order to 
move from tariffs to free trade. In many cases, agreeing on free trade may be hard and   30
honouring the agreement may be even harder. Thus, in cross border trade as in domestic 
trade, it may be difficult to devise the proper mix of positive and negative rewards. 
 
 
3.5. Policy Conclusions 
 
In principle, actual taxes could be higher or lower than optimal taxes. Also, the costs of 
negative rewards could be higher or lower of those of positive rewards. Thus, in principle, 
there is no presumption that one level of taxation or one type of tax system is better than 
another. 
 
However, in the case of tariffs, it is arguable that the optimal level is a zero tariff. Then, free 
trade is better than any other trade regime. 
 
Also, it may seem that prohibition is the cheapest system to implement in some case, for 
instance in the case of dangerous or hazardous substances. In other words, it may be 
believed that smuggling is costlier than paying any level of tariffs.  
 
However, in cases where fiscal discipline is low, prohibitions may be costlier to implement 
and thus smuggling may be cheaper than paying the tariff or other type of tax or non-tax 
barrier. Then, tariffs and even relatively modest tariffs maybe better than outright 
prohibitions. 
 
In the case of the Balkan states, it may be assumed that optimal taxes are relatively low, 
given that there is little experience with taxation and the habit to free ride is well 
entrenched. Therefore, it is natural to assume that actual taxes are seen as being too high 
and thus there are high incentives to tax evade.  
 
Also, corruption is widespread, so that prohibitive taxes only rise the level of bribes. That 
may have a modest influence on the level of illegal trade though it may decrease the level 
of trade in general. It may also affect the structure of trade, with that of smuggled goods 
being over-represented. 
 
For both reasons, trade liberalization may be a better policy than any other. As for 
smuggling, prohibitions should probably be used less because of the low administrative 
capacity. In general, states should be encouraged to earn revenues from other sources 
rather than from tariffs. 
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4. Trade as an instrument of soft security 
 
In the case of Southeast Europe, the best trade policy is that of trade liberalisation and in 
that perhaps the best regime is that of a customs union with the EU. If the experience of 
the candidate countries in Southeast Europe – Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey and now 
also Croatia – is considered, it becomes clear that keeping various levels and types of 
protection on the border creates more problems than solutions. 
 
The same should be true for the countries in the Western Balkans too. In fact, most of the 
illegal trade is the consequence of restrictions to trade rather than of trade liberalisation. 
The single most important source of illegal trade was the regime of sanctions that was 
imposed on Serbia. Other embargoes and unilateral sanctions have had the same effect. 
 
Thus, hardening the borders have had distinct effect of increasing the insecurity at least as 
far as that was connected with trade and investment. 
 
 
4.1. Internal and invisible borders 
 
Apart from the hardening of the official borders, other borders have had also quiet and 
effect on the development of  trade and other business activities in Southeast Europe. 
Here, internal borders can be distinguished from invisible borders. 
 
Internal borders exist in case where local communities or local governments act as states. 
This has been the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but can be found in other countries in 
the Western Balkans too. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, this was the 
consequence of the interference from abroad. Parts of that country functioned as if they 
were attached to a neighbouring country. That created an internal border and a barrier to 
trade, though not always a tariff one. Thus, for a while, Republika Srpska used the 
Yugoslav dinar rather than the convertible mark that has been the currency in most of the 
rest of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Croatian kuna has been used in the Croat parts of that 
country). 
 
Internal border exists between Serbia and Montenegro too. As these two countries have 
different tariffs on a number of products, they have a border that separates them as 
customs areas. They also use different currencies, which is another type of an internal 
border and a non-tariff barrier to trade. 
 
Other types of internal borders exist in other parts of the Balkans, of which Kosovo is the 
most important case. Apart from internal, there are invisible borders. To see what is meant 
by that it can be noticed that so-called ethnic trade plays a very significant role. Thus, trade   32
between Serbia and Republika Srpska is much higher than with the rest of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and the opposite is true for Croatia. In other cases trade is higher or lower 
than one would expect depending on reasons which have nothing to do with official border 
or with identifiable barriers to trade. This barriers could be called invisible borders because 
they are territorial but are also cultural or political. 
 
Both types of additional borders have significant consequences for the development of 
both legal and illegal trade. 
 
 
4.2. Borders and criminality 
 
The borders are of course the necessary condition for the existence of the cross-border 
illegal trade. The harder they are, the higher is the level of across the border criminality. 
Sanctions and other types of prohibitions are especially conducive to the growth of illegal 
activities. Indeed, in the case of Southeast Europe, those were the main source of the 
large criminal community that has grown up in this region. As there are not only official 
borders but also internal and informal ones, the ground is clearly fertile for illegal trade and 
the associated criminal activities. Those are the source of the bulk of the security problems 
that exist in the region and are not directly connected with “hard security”. 
 
Dealing with those types of criminality, a balance has to be struck between the 
strengthening of the official borders and comprehensive liberalisation. The latter could be 
termed soft security instrument. Instruments could include: 
 
Trade liberalisation. As argued above, that is one measure that could do the most when it 
comes to scaling back illegal trade. Obviously, tax evasion would not disappear and all that 
is connected with it. But most of the phenomena that are identified with the illegal trade, 
such as fake invoicing and smuggling would be diminished significantly if they were not 
disappear completely. 
 
Investment liberalisation. Cross-border investments would also diminish the need to trade 
and do business illegally. 
 
Liberalisation of trade in services. That would have an added important consequence 
because it would imply liberalisation of migration. That would help not only in the lowering 
of the illegal trade but also in the elimination of the invisible barriers. They are often 
supported by general aversion to inward migration. 
 
When it comes to internal and invisible borders, political aspects of soft-security could play 
a significant role. Increased regional cooperation would diminish the tendency to deal only   33
with one’s own kind. That would also increase competition and diminish the stronghold that 
some informal and criminal groups have over whole governments in this region. This is 
what already civil society organisations are doing, but political moves would have a much 





Liberalisation and political cooperation are the instruments of soft security which could 
contribute significantly to the decrease of illegal trading and other activities. Those 
measures come under the heading of rewards rather than punishments. Of course, the 
increase of efficiency at the official borders and many other measures would be useful too. 
But the key cause of illegal trade and the attendant security problems come from the 
proliferation of borders and tariff and non-tariff barriers rather than from the lack of security 
services. 
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